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IS THERE A FUTURE FOR PROPOSED WATER USES
IN EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT SUITS?
INTERSTATE WATER LAW-EQUITABLE APPORTION-

MENT-FUTURE USES-The United States Supreme Court in
Coloradov. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), held that the doctrine
of equitable apportionment could extend to Colorado's claim against
New Mexico to divert interstate water for proposed future uses, but
remanded to the Special Master for additional factual findings. In its
second opinion, the Court held that Colorado had failed to present
clear and convincing evidence that benefits from future uses of water
from the Vermejo River outweighed harms to existing established
New Mexico uses. Colorado had failed to conceive and implement
a long-range plan to reduce the speculative nature of its proposed
future use. Colorado v. New Mexico, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2433
(1984).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Vermejo River is an interstate stream which originates high in the
snowbelt of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in southern Colorado just
above the Colorado-New Mexico border.' The major portion of the Vermejo River lies in New Mexico. 2 New Mexico users have historically
diverted water from the Vermejo River, principally for irrigation farming
and recently for some industrial uses. 3 A 1941 New Mexico Court Decree
had adjudicated Vermejo River water rights among the historic New
Mexico users.' The dispute in Colorado v. New Mexico5 [hereinafter cited
as Vermejo I] and Colorado v. New Mexico6 [hereinafter cited as Vermejo
11] involved these decreed water rights. The Decree granted predecessors
of the current users decreed rights to use Vermejo water to irrigate 17,386.75
acres. 7
There are currently four principal New Mexico users: Vermejo Park
Corporation, Kaiser Steel Corporation, Phelps Dodge Corporation, and
1. Report of the Special Master on the Equitable Apportionment of the Vermejo River at 1, 102
S. Ct. 1417 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Special Master].
2. Three main tributaries combine to form the Vermejo River proper one mile south of the
Colorado-New Mexico border. The Vermejo flows southeasterly through semi-arid rolling plains of
Colfax County for approximately fifty-five miles. Report of the Special Master, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 181 n.5 (1982).
4. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. W.S. Land & Cattle Co., Civ. No. 7201 (N.M. Dist. Ct., Colfax Co.
1941).
5. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
6. -. U.S. -. , 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984).
7. The decreed rights were based on evidence from a 1927 hydrological survey of historic uses
of the Vermejo. Defendant's Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law No. 8 at 3, Vermejo
11 (March 5, 1983).
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the Vermejo Conservancy District. The Conservancy District consists of
some sixty farms in a federal reclamation project and includes the U.S.
Maxwell Wildlife Refuge. 8 The District had actually irrigated an average
of 4,379 acres annually over the past thirty years, although it had adjudicated water rights from the 1941 Decree to irrigate 14,621 acres. 9 The
District's historic use over the past thirty years had fallen substantially
below its decreed rights.' 0 Colorado has never used any water from the
sources of the Vermejo in Colorado. 1
In 1975, Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corporation (C.F. & I.), obtained
a conditional right from a Colorado state court to divert water from the
sources of the Vermejo. 12 C.F. & I. proposed a transmountain diversion
of Vermejo River water to a tributary of the Purgatoire River lying to the
east of the Vermejo. 3 C.F. & I. proposed an interim use to irrigate 2,000
acres. It proposed permanent uses for a hydroelectric plant to supply
power to a sawmill and timber operation; coal washing for its coal mines;
domestic and recreational purposes; "possible synthetic fuel" development; and for supplementing the inadequate water supplies of
C.F. & I., a Colorado city and a Colorado conservancy district."'
The dispute between Colorado and New Mexico began as a private
suit between the principal New Mexico water users and C.F. & I. after
C.F. & I. obtained its conditional rights to divert Vermejo River water. 5
In 1976, the principal New Mexico users asked the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Mexico to enjoin any C.F. & I. diversion. The
district court enjoined the C.F. & I. diversion in derogation of the New
Mexico users' senior water rights. 16The district court held that under the
doctrine of prior appropriation recognized by both New Mexico and
8. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 180-81 & n. 6.
9. The Report of the Special Master Containing Additional Factual Findings at 8, 103 S. Ct.
3532 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Additional Factual Findings]; Defendant's Requested Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law No. 8 at 4, Vermejo 11 (March 5, 1983). The New Mexico water users
claimed they had developed rights to irrigate some 9000 acres, while the Special Master apparently
found 5271 acres had been diligently developed. Exceptions of New Mexico to the Additional Factual
Findings of the Special Master at 91, 104 S. Ct. 329 (1983).
10. Vermejo 11, 104 S. Ct. 2433.
11. Vermejol, 459 U.S. at 178.
12. Id. at 178 (citing In re the Application for Water Rights of C.F. & I. Corp., No. W-3961
(Colo. Dist. Ct. W. Div. No. 2, June 20, 1975)).
13. Vermejo I, 459 U.S. at 178.
14. Additional Factual Findings, supra note 9, at 22. One acre-foot of water is 325,900 gallons
or enough water to cover one acre of ground one foot deep. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 180 n.5. Four
thousand acre-feet under arid conditions can irrigate approximately 2000 acres. Id.
15. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 178-79 (citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., Civ. No.
76-244 (D.N.M. 1978)).
16. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 178-79 (citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v. C.F. & 1. Steel Corporation,
Civ. No. 76-244 (D.N.M. 1978)).
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Colorado state water law, New Mexico users were entitled to satisfy fully
their needs, since their appropriations were made prior in time to the
newly proposed Colorado diversion. 7
C.F. & I. then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. 8 The Tenth Circuit stayed its proceedings after Colorado
moved for leave to file an original complaint against New Mexico in the
United States Supreme Court. In 1978, the Supreme Court assumed its
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 1 9 The Court appointed a Special Master to conduct the trial and to hear the presentation
of evidence.20 New Mexico claimed that any diversion by Colorado would
reduce the amount of water available to New Mexico users. 2 The crux
of the dispute between Colorado and New Mexico focused on whether
New Mexico's present level of use resulted from natural water shortages
or from a failure to develop their decreed water rights diligently.2 2 The
ultimate impact of C.F. & I.'s proposed diversion fell on the Vermejo
Conservancy District, which is the largest user on the river.23 Colorado
contended that the District's irrigation practices were wasteful or unreasonable.24 New Mexico contended that an unreliable supply of water
explained why its historic and current use fell so far below its decreed
rights.25
17. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 179 & n. 4. See N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. XVI,
§§ 5, 6; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§72-1-1 to -8 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973).
18. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. C.F. & 1. Steel Corp., No. 78-1193 (10th Cir. filed February 13, 1978);
Vermejo I, 459 U.S. at 179.
19. 439 U.S. 975 (1978). Article III, § 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution grants to the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over controversies between two states. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982) grants
the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between two states. Since both states
recognize that surface waters are owned by the State in trust for its citizens, a controversy between
private water users involves the state as parens patriae for its citizens. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 182
n. 9.
20. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 180. In equitable apportionment suits, the Supreme Court steps out
of its role as the final appellate court and into the role of a trial court. If the Court decides to assume
original and exclusive jurisdiction, it generally appoints a Special Master to supervise presentation
of the evidence and to prepare findings of fact, conclusons of law and a decree. See generally 17
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, § 4054
(1978) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
21. See Vermejol, 459 U.S. at 188 n.13.
22. Id. at 189. Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use water
under the prior appropriation doctrine. A water user has the right to appropriate only as much water
as is economically necessary for his use. Conversely, unnecessary waste of scarce water is not
beneficial use. The recurring theme underlying the doctrine of prior appropriation is to prevent
unreasonable uses or any waste of a scarce resource. See 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
§ 19.2 at 85-87 (1967).
23. Vermejo 11, 104 S. Ct. at 4704. The District is downstream from the other three principal
users and has a priority right which is junior in time to the three upstream users.
24. See Vermejo I, 459 U.S. at 191-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
25. Vermejo 1I, 104 S. Ct. at 4703.
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In 1981, the Special Master submitted his Report to the Supreme
Court.2 6 Applying the principles of equitable apportionment27 the Special
Master recommended that C.F. & I. be granted an annual diversion of
4000 acre-feet. 2 The Special Master concluded that Colorado had a right
to a share of the water originating in Colorado29 and that the Colorado
diversion would "not materially affect" the downstream New Mexico
users.3 ° The Special Master found that the Vermejo Conservancy District
was a failure because: (1) it had not met its debt payment schedule for
many years; (2) it had never irrigated its full amount of decreed acreage,
and (3) its diversion system was inefficient. 3 Finally, the Special Master
concluded that if there were any injury to New Mexico, the economic
benefits to Colorado would more than offset New Mexico's losses.32
In Vermejo I the Supreme Court rejected the Special Master's recommendation to grant Colorado's diversion. The Court remanded for
additional specific factual findings on whether conservation measures in
both states could offset New Mexico's loss and whether benefits to Colorado from future uses outweighed the harms to existing New Mexico
uses. 3 3 The Court held that the doctrine of equitable apportionment could
extend to a claim to divert interstate waters for future uses.
After the Vermejo I remand, the Special Master submitted his Additional
Factual Findings to the Court.34 In June 1984, the Vermejo H Court denied
Colorado any diversion from the Vermejo River. The Court held that
because Colorado had failed to show that specific conservation measures
by New Mexico were financially and physically feasible to offset its loss,
and because Colorado had not implemented a specific long-range plan
26. 102 S. Ct. 1417, supra note 1. After the Special Master submits a report, each state may
submit exceptions to the findings and conclusions. The Court reserves independent review of the
report and trial transcript, theoretically without any deference to the Special Master. See WRIGHT,
supra note 20.
27. See infra Background.
28. Report of the Special Master, supra note 1, at 22.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Special Master found that there was enough flow in the Vermejo to satisfy the full
appropriations of the three senior upstream users; that they were not diverting their fully decreed
appropriations; that Kaiser Steel had purchased rights from the Cimarron River and possibly could
purchase other rights to meet its needs. Id.
31. Id. at 7-8. The Special Master found that as much as 33 percent of the water flowing through
the diversion canals was lost before the water reached the fields to be irrigated. To deliver 100 acrefeet of water to the fields, 133 acre-feet would have to be diverted through the canals. The Master
also found that most of the farmers had full or part-time jobs elsewhere.
32. Id. at 23. Nowhere in the Report does the Special Master analyze the exact nature of Colorado's
benefits from its proposed uses.
33. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 189.
34. Colorado opposed New Mexico's motion to receive additional evidence and the Special Master
denied the motion. Based on the original record, the Master developed additional findings and
submitted the same recommendation for Colorado's diversion of 4000 acre feet. Vermejo H, 104 S.
Ct. at 2437-38.
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showing that benefits to Colorado outweighed the harm to New Mexico,
Colorado had failed to meet its burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence.
This Note will set out a brief background on the doctrine of equitable
apportionment as applied by the Supreme Court. The Court's resolution
of the conflict between protecting existing senior users and recognizing
long-range planning for proposed future uses will follow. The Note will
pay particular attention to how the Court applied the conservation and
benefits/harms factors to the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Finally,
the Note will analyze whether the Court has opened the door for states
to propose future diversions from previously fully appropriated interstate
water.
BACKGROUND: THE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT DOCTRINE
Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, we know
what to trust to: equity is according to the conscience of him that is
chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'T is all
one as if they should make the standard for the measure a chancellor's
foot. What an uncertain measure would this be! One chancellor has
a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; 't is the
same thing in a chancellor's conscience. Lord Selden. 3 '
Equitable apportionment is the term used by the Supreme Court to
identify the federal common law that determines the extent and the limitations of states' rights to benefit from and to use interstate waters.36 The
Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine to settle disputes where there
are "actual, existing controversies over how interstate streams should be
apportioned among States." 37 Equitable apportonment is a "label, not an
analysis." 38 The principal of equitable apportionment first requires the
Court to apportion interstate water so that each state may enjoy benefits
from the use of the water. Second, the principle of equitable apportionment requires the Court to divide the benefits equitably according to some
sense of fairness to both states. Since each state stands on an equal footing
with all other states with respect to each state's sovereign right to govern
its territory and property, one state may not impose its own laws on
another state.

9

35. E. GERHART, QUOTE IT: MEMORABLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS 198 (1969).
36. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907).
37. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963) (rejecting application of equitable apportionment by the Court because Congress in the Boulder Canyon Act exercised its power to control
the division of Colorado River water among the states involved).
38. 2 CLARK, supra note 22, at § 132.1.
39. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922).
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[E]quality of right refers . . . not to an equal division of water but

to the equal level or plane on which all states stand, in point of
power and right, under our constitutional system.'
The Court will apply the doctrine of equitable apportionment "in such a
way as will recognize the equal rights of both" to benefit from water
flowing through their state."
The operative principle comes down to a recognition that each state
has a property interest in the water flowing through its territory.4 2 The
problem in equitable apportionment disputes is the equitable remedy: how
to define and quantify the extent of the states' property rights. In England
equity and equitable remedies developed in response to the lack or inadequacy of legal rules and remedies in the common law courts. Equitable
apportionment as an equitable remedy developed similarly in response to
the lack of legal rules and remedies to resolve disputes between states
sharing a common resource of an interstate river. Like the equitable
remedies which developed in England, equitable apportionment provided
a more flexible approach to particular, individualized facts than common
law solutions. Like the form of other equitable decrees, equitable apportionment decrees enjoin or limit water use. 43
Once a court determines it has equitable jurisdiction,' it still must
determine whether to fashion an appropriate remedy or to decline to grant
a remedy.4" Equity courts generally look at matters of fault, ethical position, delay and hardship before fashioning a remedy.46 In equitable
apportionment suits, the Supreme Court has considered the practicality
of a particualr remedy or apportionment scheme, 4" the hardships to the
parties, and the ethical or moral position of the parties.4"
The doctrine of equitable apportionment was first applied in Kansas v.
Colorado.49 The U.S. Supreme Court stated it would not apply any fixed
40. Id.
41. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98.
42. This principle looks similar to the English common law riparian right to the natural flow of
water through a person's property. A riparian right to water came from the ownership of land which
bordered a body of water. See W. GOLDFARB, WATER LAW at 7-8 (1984); see also Vermejo 1, 459
U.S. at 179 n.4. The Supreme Court early on in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98, 102-104,
rejected the pure riparian "natural flow" doctrine. The Court acknowledged the "reasonable use"
rule which requires respect for legitimate uses by other riparian owners. In contrast, water rights
under the prior appropriation doctrine come from the law of capture and not from ownership of
land. Appropriative rights depend on the first in time to divert water for beneficial use. See I CLARK,
supra note 22 at § 39.1, at 235-236.
43. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 29 U.S. at 496.
44. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 80 passim.
45. Id. at 117-18. The decision to grant an equitable remedy is discretionary.
46. See generally, D. DOBBS, REMEDIES, §2.4 (1973).
47. See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943) (where the Court hints that Kansas'
alleged injury was suspect since she waited 21 years to bring a new suit after the 1907 decision
denying an equitable apportionment).
49. 206 U.S. at 97.
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legal rules in equitable apportionment suits. 5 ° The Court dismissed Kansas' petition to prevent continued use of the Arkansas River in Colorado."
The great benefits to Colorado in reclaiming large areas of arid land had
caused some injury to a small area in Kansas, but little injury to the area
as a whole. 2 The Court reasoned that on balance the benefits outweighed
the harms and declined to grant Kansas an equitable remedy. Further, in
New Jersey v. New York,53 Justice Holmes stated: "the different traditions
and practices in different parts of the country may lead to varying results
but the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without
quibbling over formulas." 5 4 These generalizations by the Court describe
the tone of the equitable apportionment cases, but do not predict the
resolution of particular issues at stake in each case by establishing any
hard and fast legal rules. 5
A plausible explanation for the Supreme Court's sweeping generalities
on the federal common law of equitable apportionment is the casus belli
theory. 6 Since the Constitution deprived states of the power to resort to
war or diplomacy among themselves, the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court provided a forum to settle disputes over interstate water. 7
The Court's function may be seen as a substitute for diplomatic settlement
of an interstate controversy rather than as the application of a fixed set
of legal rules to an interstate water dispute. 8
50. Id. The Court stated that it would apply state, federal or international law to develop the
federal common law as the circumstances of a particular case required. No interstate water rights
suit has clearly applied international law. 2 CLARK, supra note 22 § 132.2 at 331.
51. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117. Kansas, the downstream state on the Arkansas River,
claimed it had the right to a continuous flow of the river under the riparian doctrine which its laws
followed. Kansas claimed the later diversions in Colorado to reclaim arid lands had diminished the
river's flow and thereby had injured agricultural development in Kansas.
52. Id.
53. 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931). New Jersey sought to enjoin New York's diversion from the
Delaware River for domestic water use and asked the Court to apply the common law governing
private riparian proprietors. The Court refused to apply any strict rule.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., 2 CLARK, supra note 22, § 132.1 at 327 n. 97.
56. An occurrence giving rise to or justifying war. BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 198 (rev. 5th ed.
1979).
57. Two alternative methods exist to resolve interstate disputes over allocation of scarce water.
One method is by interstate compact and the other by Congressional apportionment. In Hinderlider
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 105 (1938), the Court stated that "resort
to the judicial remedy is never essential to the adjustment of interstate controversies, unless the
States are unable to agree upon the terms of a compact, or Congress refuses its consent." Compacts
may provide a more finely tuned mechanism to adjust the equities as day-to-day water conditions
vary. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392; F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 669-670 (3rd ed. 1979);
2 CLARK, supra note 22 § 133.1, at 359-60. Congressional legislation can also create its own
comprehensive scheme for apportionment among states. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
at 564 and n.40.
58. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 355, 372 (1923); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 185
U.S. 125, 143 (1902). The Court has, on occasion, declined to hear claims over interstate waters
when non-judicial duties beyond its Article Ill powers would be imposed. Vermont v. New York,
417 U.S. 270 (refusal to supervise execution of a settlement agreement); Texas v. New Mexico,
U.S. -,
103 S. Ct. 2558, 2566 (1983) (impasse over provisions of interstate compact not
amenable to judicial resolution).
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Application and Modification of PriorAppropriationPrinciples
Although the Court has stated that there are no fixed formulas59 for
equitable division, it has, in fact, applied the principles of prior appropriation to disputes between two states which follow prior appropriation
principles.' Thus the Court has avoided shaping a rule different from the
rules applied internally by the states themselves. 6'
In Wyoming v. Colorado,6 2 the doctrine of prior appropriation furnished
"the only basis which is consonant with the principles of right and equity"
applicable to a controversy between two states both recognizing and
enforcing the doctrine within their borders.6 3 The Wyoming v. Colorado
Court allocated the available water supply between both states in order
to account for the superior rights of senior users in both states.' While
the Court stated it was applying the principles of prior appropriation,
what in fact happened was a mass allocation of the available supply of
water.65 Years later the Court recognized that its mass allocation in Wyoming v. Colorado had modified prior appropriation principles. 6
In Nebraska v. Wyoming67 the Court rejected a mass allocation involving
Nebraska, Wyoming and Colorado. In this case the Court was willing to
modify prior appropriation principles in order to protect an economy based
on a junior appropriation.68 There need not be "a literal application of
59. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 343.
60. Wyoming v. Colorado, 359 U.S. at 470.
61. On principles adopted by the Court for disputes between two riparian states, 2 CLARK, supra
note 22 at § 132.6.
62. 259 U.S. 419.
63. Id. at 470. The source of the controversy was the use of the Laramie River which originated
in Colorado and flowed downstream into Wyoming. Many of the Wyoming users had appropriations
which were prior in time to Colorado's proposed diversion for reclamation of undeveloped land. Id.
at 457, 465. Wyoming did not seek to interfere with the existing Colorado diversions. Id. at 465.
Some of the existing Colorado users had priority over many of the Wyoming users. Id. at 489-90.
64. Id. at 495-96.
65. First the Court determined that the available water supply was insufficient to satisfy both
Wyoming and Colorado's proposed diversion. Then the Court allocated a specified amount of water
for Colorado's proposed diversion in order to allow for enough water to reach the downstream senior
Wyoming users. Id. at 489-90.
66. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 627 (1945).
67. Id. This dispute involved over one million irrigated acres in three states and a drainage area
of 27,900 square miles. Id. at 597, 592 n.2. The drainage area of the Vermejo River in Colorado
covers 25-30 square miles. Report of the Special Master, supra note 1, at 1.
68. Protection of an existing economy also concerned the Court in Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S.
at 394, a continuation of the original dispute in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46. The Colorado
v. Kansas Court again denied Kansas any relief in view of Colorado's 50 years of economic growth
in reliance on the Arkansas River while Kansas stood by. The Court based its decision on the fact
that Kansas could show no more substantial proof of injury than it had in the 1907 dispute. By
analogy, the Court's reference to Kansas sitting on its rights is similar to the equitable defense of
laches which can bar a remedy to a plaintiff who has not acted to protect violation of his rights. See
generally DoBBs, supra note 46 at § 2.4. on the defense of laches in equity suits.
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the priority rule," to reduce Colorado's uses.6 9 A strict application of
priority principles would not protect Colorado's established economy
based on junior appropriations.7° The Court concluded that priority of
appropriation is a "guiding principle" but not a "hard and fast" rule. 7
The rationale behind the Court's adjustments to prior appropriation rules
seems to be its overriding concern for and recognition of the equal rights
of each state to benefit from use of interstate water. These adjustments
suggest the principal focus of equitable aportionment is to fashion an
equitable remedy to guarantee each state its beneficial share of the water.
Balancing the Equities: Physical and Quantifiable Factors in Water
Use
Justifying its departure from prior appropriation principles, the Nebraska v. Wyoming Court also suggested an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of other factors in the calculus of equitable apportionment.7
These factors all seem to relate to a determination of the actual needs of
a particular user and can help determine how to balance the equities
between water users. Conservation of water has also been a factor the
Court has weighed to balance the equities. Each state has a duty to
conserve water from the common supply to prevent needless waste and
to provide a maximum amount of water. 73 The Court imposed a duty on
Wyoming to "employ financially and physically feasible measures adapted
to conserving and equalizing the natural flow" to benefit Colorado. 74
While the list in Nebraska v. Wyoming 7" indicates the flexibility of the
69. 325 U.S. at 618. The source of the dispute was the overappropriation of the North Platte
River which originates in Colorado and flows through Wyoming and Nebraska. Id.at 591-92, 608.
Nebraska sought to reduce Colorado appropriations which had developed much later than appropriations in Wyoming and Nebraska. Id. at 619. Colorado and Wyoming are both prior appropriation
states. Id. at 617-18, and Nebraska had adopted prior appropriation principles for the arid western
part of the state. Id. at 599-600.
70. Id.at 618.
71. Id. at 622. Professor Clark suggests that the Court recognizes the guiding principles of prior
appropriation, but through equitable apportionment makes adjustments by defering to an existing
junior economy or by making a mass allocation of supply. 2 CLARK, supra note 22, 132.5(A) at
345-346.
72. 325 U.S. at 618. These factors are
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water. . . . the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is
imposed on the former. . . .Id.
73. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 484.
74. Id. at 484-485. Wyoming had in place storage facilities to accomplish conservation of the
water supply.
75. 325 U.S. at 618 and supra note 71.
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Court's approach to equitable apportionment, it offers no guidance on
how to weigh and apply the factors in any particular situation.
Balancing the Equities: The Concept of Injury and Benefits
A continuing theme in all equitable apportionment suits is the concept
of injury. The thrust of the Court's analysis is to reach a result where
each state can receive the most benefits from use of the water with the
least amount of injury to other states. Even when a downstream state has
shown some injury, in some circumstances water from the upstream state
will never reach the downstream state because of natural conditions.76
The Court has declined to require the upstream state to stop using water,
because limiting use in one state would work a hardship with no compensating benefits."
The concept of injury in balancing the equities also comes into play
as the prerequisite for fashioning the remedy of apportionment. In Kansas
v. Colorado,78 Kansas failed to show serious injury to its substantial
interests in the productivity of its economy based on Arkansas River
water. Thirty-six years later, in Colorado v. Kansas,79 the Court once
more found Kansas could not substantiate serious injury. Kansas had
actually increased her irrigated acreage. 8" If the Court finds no substantial
injury, it has either declined to apportion and maintained the status quo 8I
or it has allowed the complaining state to divert additional water.82
The Court has analyzed benefits from the use of water in terms of the
growth of population and agricultural production.83 In Kansas v. Colorado'"
the benefits to Colorado in the development of its river valley outweighed
the little injury to Kansas. 5 The Colorado v. Kansas Court saw uses in
both states as "equally valuable beneficial uses."86
The Court has discussed "benefits" in terms similar to the concept of
beneficial use in the prior appropriation doctrine. 87 Generally, beneficial
use means the application of water to any one of a number of common
76. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 619; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 524 (1936).
77. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517.
78. 206 U.S. 46; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
79. 320 U.S. 383.
80. Id. at 399.
81. E.g., the Kansas v. Colorado disputes.
82. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
83. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 48.
86. 320 U.S. at 393.
87. Application to beneficial use is the basis for establishing the right to use water under the prior
appropriation doctrine. See N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (1978); TRELEASE,
supra note 57 at 39-45.
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uses or purposes by investing human and material resources."8 The concept
of beneficial use does not encompass the idea that some beneficial uses
might produce more benefits or be more productive than others.89
Similarly in equitable apportionment suits, the Supreme Court has
rejected arguments for increased water allocations because one state could
be more productive with the water. The Court refused to reduce Colorado's uses in Nebraska v. Wyoming' because the same amount of water
might produce more along lower sections of the North Platte in Wyoming.
In Wyoming v. Colorado,9 Colorado argued that her lands were better
agricultural lands which could produce more with less water than Wyoming could produce from stockraising and farming. Rejecting Colorado's
argument, the Court said it would not discriminate among purposes for
appropriating water on the basis of economic efficiency.92
The Concept of Future Uses in EquitableApportionment Suits
The Court's consideration of a future water use has occurred in the
context of requests for future domestic water supplies. 93 In Connecticut
v. Massachusetts,94 the Court found a Massachusetts diversion to meet a
future serious municipal water shortage was compelling. But it also found
that Connecticut could show no substantial injury if Massachusetts began
to divert water.95
A proposed future use for irrigation was the crux of the Wyoming v.
Colorado dispute.96 Wyoming protested a proposed transmountain diversion from the Laramie River by two Colorado corporations to reclaim
arid lands in another watershed. 97 Wyoming protested the future diversion
because she would lose the benefit of the return flows and because Wyoming appropriators had rights prior in time to the proposed diversion.98
Since the Wyoming v. Colorado Court found that there was some 15,000
88. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972).
89. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reynolds v. South Springs Co., 80 N.M. 144, 452 P.2d 478, 481
(1969); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133 passim (10th Cir. 1981) (the
economics of water storage is not relevant to the concept of beneficial use under New Mexico law).
90. 325 U.S. at 621.
91. 259 U.S. at 468-69.
92. Id. at 469.
93. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660. Justice
O'Connor points this out in her concurring opinion. Vermejo 1, 259 U.S. at 193 and n. 4.
94. 282 U.S. 660.
95. Id.
96. 259 U.S. 419. See supra notes 62 and 65 and accompanying text. The Vermejo Special
Master found this case similar to the current dispute over the Vermejo River between Colorado and
New Mexico. Report of the Special Master, supra note 1, at 11. Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion in Vermejo I, 459 U.S. at 193 and n. 4, disagreed with his comparison.
97. 259 U.S. at 455-56 and 464-66.
98. Id. at 456-57.
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acre-feet of unappropriated water after satisfying the senior Wyoming
users," it never had to consider balancing the benefits and harms of a
proposed future use against an already established use."
As the Court has applied the doctrine of equitable apportionment, its
basic concern has been to protect one state's reliance on the established
benefits from the use of interstate waters. At the same time, the Court
has sought to minimize the injuries resulting from competing demands
for over-allocated water supplies. The Court has drawn heavily on the
principles of prior appropriation, modifying these principles to balance
the benefits and injuries. The Court has modified these principles to protect
an existing economy and has indicated that its balancing test will incorporate relevant factors which help to quantify actual water needs.

THE VERMEJO I DECISION
Colorado presented the Vermejo I Court with a demand for Vermejo
River water for future uses which would necessarily affect the previously
existing New Mexico uses. The Supreme Court rejected the Special Master's conclusion that Colorado was entitled to a share of Vermejo water
because the Vermejo River originated in Colorado.1 ° ' The Court also
rejected New Mexico's contention that the rule of priority should be
strictly applied to preclude Colorado from any diversion. The doctrine
of equitable apportionment can support a diversion of water for proposed
future uses even when the existing users suffer some detriment. 0' 2
The Court interpreted the Special Master's conclusion to rest on two
alternative grounds. First, New Mexico could compensate for its loss of
water to Colorado through reasonable conservation measures. 03 Second,
the benefits to Colorado would substantially outweigh the injury to existing New Mexico users." 4 In order to apply the principles of equitable
99. Id. at 495-96. The Court discussed at length the conception and planning of the proposed
project which began in 1897. Actual work on the tunnel had begun in 1909, and was almost completed
in 1911 when Wyoming sued Colorado. The Court fixed 1909 as the priority date for the project,
stating that there had been no fixed purpose up to then. Id. at 490 passim.
100. Justice O'Connor in Vermejo I, 459 U.S. at 193 and n.4 contended that the Vermejo dispute
involved balancing a future use against an established use of a fully appropriated water supply, while
in Wyoming v. Colorado the Court had found unappropriated water available for the proposed future
use.
101. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 181 n. 8.
102. Id. at 182 n.9, 187.
103. Id. at 181 and n.7. The Court interpreted the Special Master's conclusion that Colorado's
diversion would not "materially affect" the New Mexico users to mean that the Conservancy District
could decrease the inefficiency of its diversion canals.
104. Id. at 181, 190.
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apportionment, the Court remanded to the Special Master for additional
specific findings on these two alternative grounds. 0 5
The issue to be resolved on remand was whether New Mexico, or
rather the Vermejo Conservancy District, was wastefully or inefficiently
using its water. The protection of senior users under prior appropriation
doctrine would not be the only criterion used to balance the equities."
The Court would also consider whether New Mexico could utilize reasonable conservation measures to offset Colorado's diversion, 0 7 and whether
the benefits to Colorado
substantially outweighed the harm to existing
10 8
New Mexico users.
The Vermejo I Court found that New Mexico had met its initial burden
of proving that the diversion would cause substantial injury, because any
diversion by Colorado would reduce the water available to New Mexico. "09 Once New Mexico proved substantial injury, the burden shifted to
Colorado to show that New Mexico could offset the loss of water through
conservation measures and that the benefits to Colorado outweighed the
possible harm to New Mexico. "10 The Court also held that Colorado must
prove these two factors by clear and convincing evidence."'
The Vermejo I Court recognized Colorado's claim for future industrial
and agricultural uses."'2 Underlying the Court's rationale for recognizing
Colorado's claim was the suspicion that the Vermejo Conservancy District
was wastefully and inefficiently using its water."' Equitable apportionment will protect only reasonably efficient uses of water. Evidence of
diligent application of water to a beneficial use is essential.114 Thus the
Court actually incorporated prior appropriation principles which also require reasonable and not wasteful or inefficient use of water." 5 The Ver105. Id. at 183, 189-90.
106. Id. at 188.
107. Id. at 188, 190. The Court recognized that New Mexico had shown that any diversion would
reduce the amount of water available to New Mexico. Id. at 188 n. 13.
108. Id. at 190.
109. Id. at 187 n.13.
110. Id. at 187 n.13 and 188.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 182 n.9 and 187 n.12, n.13. The Court relied on Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282
U.S. at 664, 672; see supra note 94 and accompanying text. Connecticut could show no substantial
injury in contrast to the Vermejo I Court's finding that New Mexico had shown a substantial injury.
The Court also relied on New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, see supra note 93 and accompanying
text. Both these decisions involved claims for increasing domestic drinking supplies to meet future
municipal water shortages.
113. See Vermejol, 459 U.S. at 184.
114. Id.at 184-85. But water rights are retained if natural conditions prevent the actual use of
water.
115. New Mexico and Colorado do not recognize wasteful uses of water. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-8-4 and 72-8-6 (1978); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-101 to 37-84-125. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 728-6 provides for a penalty or up to six months imprisonment. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-84-109 provides
for a penalty. There have been relatively few New Mexico cases on wasteful uses. See State ex rel.
Erikson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
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mejo I Court suggested that it would recognize a claim for future uses
only under these narrow circumstances. " '
The Court then focused on the proper analysis to support Colorado's
claim for future uses. Relying on the factors set out in Nebraska v.
Wyoming" 7 the Court asked the Special Master for specific findings on:
(1) whether the existing New Mexico uses reflected current or historic
water shortages or the failure to develop the use diligently;
(2) whether the available supply of water could be enhanced by water
storage, conservation and substitute sources;
(3) whether conservation measures in both states could eliminate waste
and inefficient uses;
(4) the precise nature of and benefits from Colorado's proposed future
uses;
(5) the likely injury to New Mexico from any diversion, taking 8into
account reasonable conservation measures to offset the loss."t
These specific factual findings would aid the Court to adjust the two
states' interests based on the conservation and the benefits/harms analysis. 119

The Vermejo I Court imposed an affirmative duty on both states to
conserve and augment water supplies by "financially and physically feasible" conservation measures. 20
' The Court had more difficulty in applying
the benefits/harms analysis to the equities of apportioning water for a
future use. 2 ' The Court said that the principle of balancing benefits against
harms between two existing users also applied to balancing the benefits
of a "diversion for proposed uses against the possible harms to existing
uses."22 The Court relied on Connecticut v. Massachusetts 23 to extend
the benefit/harms analysis to a future use.' 24 Even though New Mexico
116. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 183 n.9, 187. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983),
where the Court said that to recalculate the amount of practically irrigable acreage would undermine
the reliance of states and private interests on prior water adjudicatons. Id. at 621.
117. 384 U.S. at 618; see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
118. Vermejo 1,459 U.S. at 189-190.
119. Id. at 183.
120. Id. at 185-186. New Mexico objected to employing conservation measures to facilitate
upstream Colorado uses, just as Wyoming in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 484, had objected.
The Vermejo I Court replied that the spirit of prior appropriation imposed a duty on each state to
conserve the common supply. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 185-186.
121. See Vermejo 1,459 U.S. at 186-187.
122. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court relied on its analysis of benefits and harms in Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 100-01, 113, 114, 117 and in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589. In
those cases the Court had protected the status quo of existing water uses. In Kansas v. Colorado,
Kansas had not managed to show any substantial injury. In both cases the "benefit" was the fact
that Colorado had an established economy based on use of the water. Both decisions stand for the
general proposition that "benefit" means having water available to use for a chosen economic activity.
123. 282 U.S. 660, 664, 672; see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124. Vermejol, 459 U.S. at 187 and n.13.
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had shown substantial injury would result from any Colorado diversion,
the Court determined that the future benefits to Colorado might justify
the injury to the New Mexico users.' 25 In this context, the Court required
that Colorado show by clear and convincing evidence that its benefits
substantially outweighed New Mexico's injuries.26
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence criticized the majority's approach
to the benefit/harms analysis.' 27 She feared the Court had adopted a "new
yardstick" to measure the wasteful or unreasonable practices of the Vermejo Conservancy District "by conparing the 'inefficiency' of New Mexico's uses with the relative benefits to Colorado of a new use. '",28 She
criticized the Special Master for succumbing to the suggestion that Colorado could make a "better" use of the Vermejo water.'29 Relying on the
principles of prior appropriation that water use should be beneficial and
reasonable, Justice O'Connor stated that the proper yardstick was to
compare "economic gains to the District with the costs of achieving
3oJustice O'Connor specifically rejected a comparison
greater efficiency. ",
of the Conservancy District's inefficiency to Colorado's benefits. She
reminded the majority that the Court had assessed benefit and detriment
only in the context of two existing uses "by reference to the actual fruits"
of water use, or in the context of a compelling need for a future supply
of drinking water. ' She reminded the majority that New Mexico's actual
uses had equal importance to any proposed Colorado uses.' 32 Justice
O'Connor accepted changing the status quo only in the context of clear
and convincing evidence that the Vermejo Conservancy District had engaged in unreasonably wasteful or inefficient practices.' 33 To grant Colorado the future use, Justice O'Connor warned, would disregard the equality
of rights of the two states and would undermine prior appropriation as a
guiding principle by entertaining Colorado's allegations of a "better" use
even when New Mexico's use was entirely reasonable.' 4
THE VERMEJO 11 DECISION
One and one-half years after the remand in Vermejo I,the Court reviewed the Special Master's Additional Factual Findings and New Mex125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 191 (O'Connor, J. with Powell, J.concurring in the judgment).
128. Id. at 192.
129. Id. at 193.
130. Id.at 192.
131. Id.at 193-94 and n.4, see supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
132. Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 195. Chief Justice Burger also emphasized the equal footing of the
two states. Id. at 190-91 (Burger, C. J. with Stevens, J. concurring in the opinion and the judgment).
Thus four of the Justices appeared to oppose any "better use" doctrine.
133. Id. at 195.
134. Id.
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ico's Exceptions to his Findings. Reviewing the evidence on the five
specific factual issues raised in Vermejo I,' the Vermejo H Court concluded that Colorado had not shown by clear and convincing evidence
that a diversion should be permitted.' 36 Justice O'Connor wrote for the
majority.
The Vermejo H Court explained in more detail why Colorado's evidence
would be judged by a clear-and-convincing evidence standard. 3' 7 A state
proposing a diversion for future uses should bear most of the risks of an
erroneous decision, because potential benefits of a proposed diversion
may be speculative, while harm to established uses is more likely certain. ' The Vermejo H Court justified use of the higher standard of proof
because of the "unique interests involved in water rights disputes between
sovereigns."' 39 Additionally, the Court said the higher standard serves
society's interest in preserving the stability of property rights and in
allocating resources to the most efficient uses.'" The Court concluded
that Colorado's proposed future diversion would meet the clear-and-convincing evidence standard if the evidence showed actual inefficiencies in
present uses or the high probability of future benefits. 4 '
After setting out the evidenciary standard, the Court reviewed the
evidence on the conservation question. New Mexico's three decades of
non-use of much of its decreed water rights was suspect, even though
unreliable water supply explained some of the difference between historic
use and decreed rights. 4 Without actually resolving the factual issue of
New Mexico's alleged non-use, the Court addressed the issue of whether
New Mexico could more efficiently conserve the Vermejo water supply. "'
The Court found that Colorado had not pointed to any specific measures
which New Mexico could implement to conserve its water supply. First,
the Court rejected Colorado's evidence which criticized New Mexico
water management by the State Engineer.'" Second, the Court rejected
135. See supra text accompanying note 118. The Special Master reorganized his original findings
under the five issues outlined by the Court in his Additional Factual Findings, supra note 9. See
also supra note 34.
136. 104 S. Ct. 2433. The Court actually made a de novo review of the evidence and rejected
the Special Master's Additional Factual Findings.
137. Vermejo 11,104 S. Ct. at 2438; see also Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 188 n. 13. The function of
a higher standard than the normal preponderance of the evidence standard relates to the degree of
confidence society wants the factfinder to have in the particular subject matter. The Vermejo I1 Court
relied on In re Winship, 397 U.S 358, 370 (1970) and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 425
(1971). Both impose a higher standard of proof when an individual faces either civil or criminal
confinement by the state.
138. Vermejo II, 104 S. Ct. at 2438.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.at 2439.
143. Id.
144. Id.at 2440.
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Colorado's evidence that the Vermejo Conservancy District was less efficient than other reclamation projects. 45
'
Colorado and the Special Master had criticized New Mexico water
management policies for laxity in controlling water use. The Court found
these criticisms too general and not specifically directed to measures
which could preserve the supply of Vermejo River water.'46 Colorado
also had failed to identify what specific conservation measures by the
District were "financially and physically feasible" to eliminate or reduce
inefficiency.' 4 7 The Court required evidence that the project was "far less
efficient than most other projects." "14 The Court wanted evidence of actual
waste or inefficiency and evidence of specific conservation measures.
Colorado had supplied no evidence which met the Court's standards.
Finally, looking at Colorado's duty to conserve,' 49 the Court found that
Colorado had failed to identify
any specific measures it would take to
0
minimize its diversion. 15
Next the Court examined the evidence in order to balance the benefits
and harms which would result from the proposed diversion. The Court
rejected Colorado's evidence on its proposed future uses. In the Court's
view, Colorado had not "committed itself to any long-term use for which
future benefits can be studied and predicted.""'i' Colorado had only established that a steel corporation wanted water for "some unidentified
use in the future. "1 52 Colorado had not committed itself to any permanent
use in the nine years since C.F. & I. had obtained its conditional right
in the Colorado courts.'3 The probable water use by C.F. & I. for coal
mining, timbering, power generation, domestic and industrial operations
which the Special Master had identified were too speculative under the
145. Id. Efficiency measures the loss of water between the point of diversion and the application
to crops. TRELEASE, supra note 57, at 68. The lower the water loss, the higher the efficiency. The
Special Master had concluded that the District had an overall efficiency of 24.6%. New Mexico
claimed this fell in the middle range for reclamation project efficiencies. Additional Factual Findings,
supra note 9, at 20.
146. Vermejo II, 104 S. Ct. at 2440. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, id. at 2446, criticized
the majority's approach. He found enough evidence in the Special Master's Reports to conclude
that New Mexico was hiding its inefficient uses behind the mask of lax water administration. He
felt the majority had not analyzed the data on the management practices of the state and the
Conservancy District, but rather focused on Colorado's failure to show specific conservation measures
New Mexico could implement.
147. Id. at 2440; see, e.g., Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 192.
148. Vermejo 1I, 104 S.Ct. at 2440.
149. See Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 186. The Special Master had relied on Colorado's strict administration of water use to find that Colorado would undertake reasonable conservation efforts. Additional Factual Findings, supra note 9, at 20.
150. Vermejo 1I, 104 S.Ct. at 2440.
151. Id. at 2441.
152. Id.; Additional Factual Findings, supra note 9, at 22 passim; contra Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. at 490 passim.
153. Vermejo II,104 S.Ct. at 2441; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Court's clear-and-convincing evidence standard to allow a Colorado diversion. 54
The Court recognized that forecasting benefits from future uses without
assurance of a water supply will always be speculative and imprecise. 155
What the Court required was some long-range plan and analysis of the
future uses that would be certain enough in its predictions to meet the
clear-and-convincing evidence standard. 51 6 The Vermejo II Court pointed
out that New Mexico had commissioned an economic study as evidence
of its efficient use of water and as evidence of the direct and indirect
injuries which Colorado's proposed diversion would cause."' Colorado
could make a similar effort "to prove that its future economy could do
' Colorado's
better."158
evidence consisted of generalizations and specu59
lation,' which could not meet the greatest possible burden of proof in
a civil case. Thus the Vermejo II Court dismissed Colorado's suit for an
apportionment, deciding not to exercise its equitable powers."
The Special Master had also concluded that Colorado was entitled to
a share of the Vermejo because she produced three-fourths of its water. 161
The Vermejo II Court rejected his conclusion. 62 The source of the Vermejo
was irrelevant to Colorado's claim, because appropriative rights recognized by both states depended on actual use rather than on land ownership. 163 The Vermejo II Court still left open the possibility that a state's
specific long-range plan for a future water use could command an apportionment if its "efficiency" in the use of water were "better" than the
existing uses of water. "
ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF THE VERMEJO DECISIONS ON THE
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT DOCTRINE
The Vermejo I Court opened the door for a state to propose an equitable
apportionment of a fully appropriated scarce water supply based on a
154. Id.; see, e.g., Additional Factual Findings, supra note 9, at 23.
155. Vermejo /, 104 S.Ct. at 2441.
156. Id.
157. Id. This study was submitted to the Special Master at the original hearings before the Vermejo
I decision.
158. Id. (emphasis added); Justice O'Connor in Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 193, had criticized this
approach. Justice Stevens in his Vermejo II dissent criticized the majority's approach as the equivalent
of giving New Mexico an "A for effort" and penalizing Colorado for making no similar effort.
Vermejo 1I, 104 S. Ct. at 2443 n.1.
159. Vermejo II, 104 S. Ct. at 2441.
160. Vermejo 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2442.
161. Additional Factual Findings, supra note 9, at 29; Report of the Special Master, supra note
1, at 8, 23.
162. Vermejo 1I, 104 S.Ct. at 2441-2442; accord Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 179 n.4, and 181 n.8.
163. Vermejo H, 104 S.Ct. at 2442; but see Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 191 (Burger, C. J. concurring
in the opinion) (each state has the right to benefit from its waters since states on equal footing); see
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 80 passim, for the Court's discussion of the basis for equitable
jurisdiction over interstate waters.
164. Vermejo 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2441.
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plan for future uses. The Vermejo H Court signaled its commitment to
concrete long-range plans by its willingness to reopen this suit when
' Whether
Colorado produced sufficient evidence of changed circumstances. 65
practices
state's
inefficient
of
one
evidence
alone
without
planning
future
would justify an equitable apportionment is unclear from the Vermejo H
decision. The Court could well be opening a Pandora's box if it were to
consider two sets of competing concrete plans for future uses.
The Vermejo H decision, in effect, protected the status quo and preserved existing New Mexico rights to use Vermejo River water. This
result aligns itself with previous equitable apportionment suits. In those
cases the Court had protected the existing water uses because the complaining state failed to show serious injury or because a change in the
status quo would not result in any benefits to the complaining state.
Finding the position of both Colorado and New Mexico suspect, 166 the
Court declined to exercise its equitable powers.
By imposing the clear-and-convincing evidence standard on Colorado,
the Court sidestepped the real factual issues of how much water was
available to the Vermejo Conservancy District and of the District's wasteful or inefficient practices. The Court simply protected New Mexico's
reliance interests without reaching a conclusion based on the evidence in
the record. The trial transcript and exhibits provided volumes of detailed
evidence from which the Court could have resolved the factual issues.
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, 167 was able to find ample evidence of New Mexico's waste and inefficiency in the record.
The Court had never before considered a future use as the basis for an
equitable apportionment outside the context of a compelling need for
municipal drinking water. A compelling need for drinking water has
provided the rationale for a finding that a proposed future use can be the
basis for an equitable apportionment. Colorado's proposed future agricultural and industrial water uses appear to lack any similar compelling
need to justify an equitable apportionment. The Vermejo I Court relied
on the drinking water cases 68 to justify balancing benefits of proposed
uses against harms to existing uses. 69 The Court's reliance is misplaced.
In Connecticut v. Massachusetts,70 the Court never had to balance benefits
against harms because it found there was available water and therefore
no injury to Massachusetts. The Vermejo Court admitted that the Vermejo
water supply was fully appropriated and that New Mexico had shown
injury to its interests. The Vermejo Court did suggest, however, that its
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Vermejo 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2442.
See supra text accompanying notes 142 and 151 to 153.
Vermejo II, 104 S. Ct. at 2442 passim.
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 and New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336.
Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 186-87.
282 U.S. 660.
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consideration of Colorado's future uses was only appropriate because it
suspected inefficient practices by the Vermejo Conservancy District. The
Vermejo Court failed to limit future use cases to similar situations.
The Vermejo I Court injected new meaning into the benefit/harms
balancing test. Previously, the Court had balanced the equities by weighing the benefits and injuries to competing existing uses. In its prior
decisions, the Court had evaluated "benefit" to mean that some general
economic activity benefited from the use of that state's water. The Court
had always recognized the prior appropriation concept of beneficial use
in its equitable apportionment suits.
In the Vermejo dispute the Court compared an existing use to a proposed
use. The Vermejo I Court suggested it would evaluate Colorado's plan
for future water-based economic activity to see if it was "better" than
New Mexico's competing economic activity. The Vermejo H Court did
not clearly reject the "new yardstick" "better use" analysis criticized by
Justice O'Connor in Vermejo I. The Vermejo H Court. never compared
the Conservancy District's existing uses with the proposed uses by Colorado. Instead, it rejected Colorado's plan as too speculative and praised
New Mexico's economic study of water usage. While the Vermejo H
Court's invitation to submit future plans with "better" uses may have
been a judicial accommodation to the "new yardstick" approach of Vermejo I, its invitation undermines the concept of beneficial use and undermines water users' reliance on their prior appropriative rights. The
next equitable apportionment suit could well be a battle about "better"
uses in competing plans rather than a consideration of quantifiable and
existing benefits and injuries.
Equitable apportionment on the basis of "better" uses could more
rationally redistribute scarce water resources in arid western states. Competing states and competing interest groups should take note. The Vermejo
Court has indicated an activist posture on long-range economic and social
planning in the natural resources area. This activist posture encroaches
upon the traditional forums in which competing groups have negotiated
and compromised over the management and allocation of water supplies.
Private users have traditionally been able to purchase a prior existing
water right under state law prior appropriation principles. Under the prior
appropriation doctrine, the economics of the marketplace may operate to
transfer water uses into more economically profitable areas. In the political
forum competing groups have also used Congress or interstate compact
commissions as vehicles to allocate the water supply. Now these competing groups might consider the Supreme Court as a vehicle to resolve
these issues of allocation.
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CONCLUSION
The Vermejo H Court's invitation to apportion based on concrete planning for future uses parallels its recent Commerce Clause analysis in
Sporhase v. Nebraska'7 ' that water is an article of commerce. The Sporhase Court struck down state statutes which impermissibly prevent the
exportation of water for out-of-state use. The Sporhase Court found that
the legal fiction of state ownership of its water resources was not sufficient
to preserve a state's water supply for its own citizens and to remove water
from Commerce Clause scrutiny.'72 The Vermejo I Court found that New
Mexico's fully appropriated use of the Vermejo might not prevent Colorado's planned future use even when Colorado had never used the Vermejo
River water. Under Commerce Clause scrutiny a state's legal rights give
way to water exportation. Under the equitable apportionment doctrine a
state's legal rights give way to a fair distribution of water resources.'
Planned future uses seem to have caught the Court's attention whether
a suit is in the posture of a Commerce Clause case or an equitable
apportionment case. Applying the Sporhase Court's Commerce Clause
analysis, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico acknowledged El Paso's right to the future use of New Mexico's unappropriated groundwater striking down New Mexico's embargo on water
exportation.' 74 Recognizing a planned future use as the basis for an equitable apportionment, the Vermejo H Court rejected Colorado's plan as
too speculative. New Mexico may have temporarily won the Vermejo
River battle with Colorado over a pittance of water at its northern border,
but in long run, New Mexico may have lost the war with Texas over its
vast reserves of underground water on its southern border.
By entertaining the notion of comparing one state's planning for "better" future uses against another state's existing uses, the Vermejo Court
has undermined the Court's previous recognition of the equality of beneficial uses. The recognition of sovereign states' rights to benefit from
and to control property within their borders underlies the Court's equity
171. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
172. id. at 951-52 (Rehnquist, J.and O'Connor, J.dissenting).
173. See Idaho ex rel.
Evans v.Oregon, U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2817 (1983). Applying the
equitable apportionment doctrine to a division of anadromous fish, the Court stated that the same
principle that a "State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants [its] natural resources" lies
at the root of the equitable apportionment doctrine. Id. at 2823.
174. El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), judgment vacated and remanded,
No. 83-1350 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1983). The Tenth Circuit remanded to the District Court in light
of the New Mexico Legislature's repeal of the embargo statute. The District Court, 597 F. Supp.
694 (D.N.M. 1984), considered the new statutes which limited water exports to those not contrary
to water conservation or detrimental to the public welfare.
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jurisdiction to make a fair distribution of a shared and scarce resource.
Allocation on an economic benefit model is not without its virtues. Yet
by inviting such an allocation, the Vermejo Court may have disturbed
present water users' reliance on the certainty of their existing water uses.
The answers to how the Court will actually balance the reliance interests
of existing water users against a water plan for future uses will depend
on whether competing states will see an equitable apportionment suit as
a vehicle to implement their long-range plans for water use.
ANN MACON McCROSSEN

